63 research outputs found
Query Complexity of Correlated Equilibrium
We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated
equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game
is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action
profiles. In this model we establish that in order to compute a correlated
equilibrium any deterministic algorithm must query the black box an exponential
(in n) number of times.Comment: Added reference
The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies
We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange
economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining
outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded)
by coalitions of small size and show that these allocations must be approximate
Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is
approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for
which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.Comment: 26 page
Finding Any Nontrivial Coarse Correlated Equilibrium Is Hard
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium
concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such
equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist
polynomial-time algorithms that compute exact (coarse) correlated equilibria.
In light of these results, a natural question is how good are the (coarse)
correlated equilibria that can arise from any efficient algorithm or dynamics.
In this paper we address this question, and establish strong negative
results. In particular, we show that in multiplayer games that have a succinct
representation, it is NP-hard to compute any coarse correlated equilibrium (or
approximate coarse correlated equilibrium) with welfare strictly better than
the worst possible. The focus on succinct games ensures that the underlying
complexity question is interesting; many multiplayer games of interest are in
fact succinct. Our results imply that, while one can efficiently compute a
coarse correlated equilibrium, one cannot provide any nontrivial welfare
guarantee for the resulting equilibrium, unless P=NP. We show that analogous
hardness results hold for correlated equilibria, and persist under the
egalitarian objective or Pareto optimality.
To complement the hardness results, we develop an algorithmic framework that
identifies settings in which we can efficiently compute an approximate
correlated equilibrium with near-optimal welfare. We use this framework to
develop an efficient algorithm for computing an approximate correlated
equilibrium with near-optimal welfare in aggregative games.Comment: 21 page
Traffic-Redundancy Aware Network Design
We consider network design problems for information networks where routers
can replicate data but cannot alter it. This functionality allows the network
to eliminate data-redundancy in traffic, thereby saving on routing costs. We
consider two problems within this framework and design approximation
algorithms.
The first problem we study is the traffic-redundancy aware network design
(RAND) problem. We are given a weighted graph over a single server and many
clients. The server owns a number of different data packets and each client
desires a subset of the packets; the client demand sets form a laminar set
system. Our goal is to connect every client to the source via a single path,
such that the collective cost of the resulting network is minimized. Here the
transportation cost over an edge is its weight times times the number of
distinct packets that it carries.
The second problem is a facility location problem that we call RAFL. Here the
goal is to find an assignment from clients to facilities such that the total
cost of routing packets from the facilities to clients (along unshared paths),
plus the total cost of "producing" one copy of each desired packet at each
facility is minimized.
We present a constant factor approximation for the RAFL and an O(log P)
approximation for RAND, where P is the total number of distinct packets. We
remark that P is always at most the number of different demand sets desired or
the number of clients, and is generally much smaller.Comment: 17 pages. To be published in the proceedings of the Twenty-Third
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithm
Algorithmic Aspects of Optimal Channel Coding
A central question in information theory is to determine the maximum success
probability that can be achieved in sending a fixed number of messages over a
noisy channel. This was first studied in the pioneering work of Shannon who
established a simple expression characterizing this quantity in the limit of
multiple independent uses of the channel. Here we consider the general setting
with only one use of the channel. We observe that the maximum success
probability can be expressed as the maximum value of a submodular function.
Using this connection, we establish the following results:
1. There is a simple greedy polynomial-time algorithm that computes a code
achieving a (1-1/e)-approximation of the maximum success probability. Moreover,
for this problem it is NP-hard to obtain an approximation ratio strictly better
than (1-1/e).
2. Shared quantum entanglement between the sender and the receiver can
increase the success probability by a factor of at most 1/(1-1/e). In addition,
this factor is tight if one allows an arbitrary non-signaling box between the
sender and the receiver.
3. We give tight bounds on the one-shot performance of the meta-converse of
Polyanskiy-Poor-Verdu.Comment: v2: 16 pages. Added alternate proof of main result with random codin
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